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SOME ANSWERS TO THE DAUBERT
PUZZLE
RONALD SIMON*
As an author of an amicus brief' submitted in Daubert v. Mer-
rell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,2 I was invited to speak at the Au-
gust 1993, American Bar Association Convention on the meaning
of the up-coming decision. The printer's schedule required that
written presentations for the conference be submitted prior to the
opinion of the Court being issued. Accordingly, after reviewing
the briefs,3 including twenty-two amici briefs that probed deeply
* Partner, Connerton, Ray & Simon, Washington, D.C.; A.B., J.D., Harvard University.
See Brief of Daryl E. Chubin, Ph.D.; Edward J. Hackett, Ph.D.; David M. Ozonoff,
M.D., M.P.H.; Richard W. Clapp, Sc.D., M.P.H., in Support of Petitioner, Daubert (No. 92-
102).
2 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
3 Fourteen amicus briefs were filed in support of Appellee, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc., see the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the National
Academy of Sciences, Daubert (No. 92-102); the American Medical Association, American
Medical Association-Specialty Society Medical Liability Project et al., Daubert (No. 92-102);
Nicholas Blombergen, Erminio Costa, Dudley Herschbach, Jerome Karle, Arthur Langer,
Wassily Leontief, Richard S. Lindzen, William M. Lipscomb, Donald B. Louria, John B.
Little, A. Alan Moghissi, Brooke T. Mossman, Robert Nolan, Arno A. Penzias, Frederick
Sietz, A. Frederick Spilhaus, Dimitrios Trichopoulos & Richard Wilson, Daubert (No. 92-
102); the New England Journal of Medicine, Journal of the American Medical Association,
& Annals of Internal Medicine, Daubert (No. 92-102); the United States Solicitor General,
Daubert (No. 92-102); the Washington Legal Foundation, Daubert (No. 92-102); the Ameri-
can College of Legal Medicine, Daubert (No. 92-102); the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America, Daubert (No. 92-102); the Product Liability Advisory Council,
Inc., National Association of Manufacturers, Business Roundtable & Chemical Manufac-
turers Association, Daubert (No. 92-102); the American Tort Reform Association, Daubert
(No. 92-102); the American Insurance Association, Daubert (No. 92-102); the Pharmaceuti-
cal Manufacturers Association, Daubert (No. 92-102); Professor Alvan R.F. Feinstein,
Daubert (No. 92-102); the Defense Research Institute, Inc., Daubert (No. 92-102).
Seven amicus briefs were filed in support of Petitioners, see Physicians, Scientists &
Historians of Science (namely, Ronald Bayer, Stephen J. Gould, Gerald Holton, Peter In-
fante, Philip Landrigan, Everett Mendelsohn, Robert Morris, Herbert Needleman, Dorothy
Nelkin, William Nicholson, Kathleen Joy Property and David Rosner), Daubert (No. 92-
102); Daryl E. Chubin, Ph.D., Edward J. Hackett, Ph.D., David M. Ozonoff, M.D., M.P.H. &
Richard W. Clapp, Sc.D., M.P.H., Daubert (No. 92-102); the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America, Daubert (No. 92-102); the State of Texas, Daubert (No. 92-102); the State of Mon-
tana, Daubert (No. 92-102); the State of Idaho, Daubert (No. 92-102); the State of South
Dakota, Daubert (No. 92-102); Professors Kenneth Rothman, Noel Weiss, James Robins,
Raymond Neutra & Steven Stellman, Daubert (No. 92-102); the American Society of Law,
Medicine & Ethics, Devra Lee Davis, Ph.D., Daubert (No. 92-102); Marvin S. Legator, M.D.,
Daubert (No. 92-102); Donald R. Mattison, M.D., Daubert (No. 92-102); the Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Program on Gender, Science and Law of Columbia University
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into many issues dealing with the overlap of law and science in
the area of toxic torts, I predicted that the upcoming decision of
the Court would have serious shortcomings because the "wrong"
questions had been presented.4 Based on my view that Frye v.
United States5 was not good law, and that peer review could not be
legitimately used as an outcome-determinative basis for excluding
expert testimony,6 I conjectured that the focus on these "easy" is-
sues for review would not lead the Daubert Court to provide much
useful guidance on the issues of "causation" in toxic tort cases.
Thus, in a publication shortly after the decision,7 perhaps un-
consciously needing to prove that my earlier prognostication had
been correct, I pointed out how much the Court did not decide.
Nonetheless, a few months of further reflection have put the deci-
sion in better perspective. Rereading the decision and studying
the commentaries already available8 have led to the inescapable
School of Public Health, Daubert (No. 92-102); Allan Rosenfield, M.D., Daubert (No. 92-
102); Ellen K Silbergeld, Ph.D., Daubert (No. 92-102).
Two amicus briefs were filed in support of neither party, see Carnegie Commission on
Science, Technology & Government, Daubert (No. 92-102); and the American Law Profes-
sors, Daubert (No. 92-102).
4 See Ronald Simon, Address at the ABA Program on Scientific Evidence (Aug. 9, 1993).
5 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (concerning admissibility of lie detector test results), over-
ruled by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
6 In hindsight, these issues appear to have been easily resolved. However, overruling
Frye and no longer requiring scientific conclusions to be based in peer-reviewed literature
were hardly foregone conclusions. See Brief for the State of Idaho in support of Petitioner,
Daubert (No. 92-102); Brief for the State of Montana in support of Petitioner, Daubert (No.
92-102); Brief for the State of South Dakota in support of Petitioner, Daubert (No. 92-102)
(noting that number of circuits followed or adopted Frye as well as many state courts and
including extensive citations to state and federal court decisions that endorsed Frye); Brief
for the State of Texas in support of Petitioner, Daubert (No. 92-102).
For amicus briefs in support of Appellee, see Washington Legal Foundation, Daubert
(No. 92-102) (arguing that Frye was law); the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, Daubert (No. 92-102) (same); the New England Journal of Medicine, the Journal
of the American Medical Association & Annals of Internal Medicine, Daubert (No. 92-102)
(emphasizing importance of peer review requirement for scientific opinion).
7 See Ronald Simon, High Court Throws Out Rigid Rules Excluding Scientific Evidence,
Says Focus Must Be on Methods, Principles, 21 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at
11-15 (Summer-Fall 1993).
8 Francisco J. Ayala & Bert Black, Decision Will Lead to Improvement in Courts' Screen-
ing of Scientific Evidence, 21 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 28 (Summer-Fall
1993); David E. Bernstein & Peter W. Huber, "Daubert"Plaintiffs Won Technical Battle but
Plainly Lost the War, 21 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 16 (Summer-Fall
1993); Daniel J. Capra, Decision Unlikely to Have Real Impact on State or Federal Toxic
Tort Litigation, 21 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 22 (Summer-Fall 1993);
Anne E. Cohen, Impact of Ruling Will Depend on Weight Courts Give to "Reliability Fac-
tors", 21 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 35 (Summer-Fall 1993); Thomas W.
Henderson, Daubert Unlikely to Change Courts' Treatment of Expert Evidence, 21 Prod.
Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 33 (Summer-Fall 1993); Clifton T. Hutchinson,
"Daubert" Confirms Judge's Gatekeeper Role, 21 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at
12 (Summer-Fall 1993); Kenneth J. Rothman, Supreme Court Ruling Edges Courtroom
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conclusion that the Daubert decision represents a major advance
in the jurisprudence of law and science.
I. THE COURT REJECTS FRYE AND OTHER REDUCTIONIST
APPROACHES TO SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
The primary thrust of the Daubert decision is to reject simplis-
tic, outcome-determinative standards such as "generally accepted"
and "peer reviewed," which can be automatically and reflexively
applied without examining the entire context and range of facts
and theories that pertain to a question. The intellectual strength
of the Court's flexible, contextual, and inclusive approach to scien-
tific evidence may be viewed regarding the necessity of statisti-
cally significant data. In advancing its position that Bendectin
has not been proven to be associated with birth defects, the de-
fendant had argued that the data and studies relied upon by
plaintiffs did not reach the level of "statistical significance." The
phrase "statistical significance" was used by defendant Merrell
Dow and its amici to suggest that studies and data that are not
"statistically significant" have no meaning, value, or significance
to scientists.
An amicus brief by Dr. Kenneth Rothman et al.,9 whom the de-
fendants' counsel at oral argument conceded to be America's pre-
Closer to Science, 21 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 26 (Summer-Fall 1993);
Ronald Simon, High Court Throws Out Rigid Rules Excluding Scientific Evidence, Says
Focus Must Be on Methods, Principles, 21 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 5
(Summer-Fall 1993); V. Hale Starr, Ph.D., Aftermath of 'Daubert" Will See Experts Pre-
pared to Explain Testimony More Clearly, 21 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 38
(Summer-Fall 1993); Gary A. Weinstein, After "Daubert": Good Lawyering, Expert Prepara-
tion, Still the Key, 21 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 11-44 (Summer-Fall 1993);
see also Jeffrey Mervis, Supreme Court to Judges: Start Thinking Like Scientists, SCIENCE,
July 2, 1993, at 22; Kenneth R. Foster et al., Science and the Toxic Tort, SCIENCE, Sept. 17,
1993, at 1509; Philip H. Abelson et al., Toxic Terror; Phantom Risks, SCIENCE, July 23,
1993, at 407; David E. Bernstein & Peter W. Huber, Defense Perspective, SHEPARD'S EXPERT
& SCI. EVID. Q., July 1993, at 59; Bert Black & John Andrew Singer, From Frye to Daubert:
A New Test for Scientific Evidence, SHEPARD'S EXPERT & SCI. EVID. Q., July 1993, at 19;
George W. Conk, Commentary: Daubert v. Merrell Dow, SHEPARD'S EXPERT & SCI. EVID. Q.,
July 1993, at 55; Michael D. Green, Relief at the Frying of Frye: Reflections on Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, SHEPARD's EXPERT & ScI. EVID. Q., July 1993, at 43; Barry J.
Nace, Reaction to Daubert, SHEPARD's EXPERT & SCI. EVID. Q., July 1993, at 51; David
Bernstein, Hauling Junk Science Out of the Courtroom, WALL ST. J., July 13, 1993, at A16;
Bert Black & John Andrew Singer, Judicial Control of Scientific Evidence: The Implica-
tions of Daubert, ABA SEC. OF Bus. L. (Aug. 9, 1993); Kathiann M. Kowalski, Challenging
Expert Testimony After Daubert, ABA SEC. OF NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY & ENV'rL. L.
(Oct. 2, 1993).
9 See Brief of Professors Kenneth Rothman, Noel Weiss, James Robins, Raymond Neutra
& Steven Stellman, in support of Petitioner, at 2 n.2, Daubert (No. 92-102).
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eminent epidemiologist, explained that "statistical significance" is
a term describing one of a variety of tests for a larger concept
known as the "stability of numbers." Dr. Rothman stated that no
epidemiologist believes that findings that are not statistically sig-
nificant are without value or should not be considered in making a
judgment about whether an association exists. Dr. Rothman also
noted that a determination that data is "statistically significant"
does not ipso facto lead a scientist to believe that an association
exists. Dr. Rothman's views were essentially unchallenged by the
defendants and their amici. The strength of the Court's commit-
ment to an open and flexible approach to the admissibility of sci-
entific evidence was underscored by its refusal to even mention
the concept of "statistical significance," despite the importance it
had played in defendant's arguments. The Court's appreciation of
the complexity and uncertainty of scientific information
dovetailed with the Court's reiteration that the Federal Rules of
Evidence favor admissibility and that new rules to limit admissi-
bility should not be invented by judges.
The second major theme of the Daubert decision was the Court's
confidence that the American system of trial by jury is adequate to
handle complex toxic tort cases. To critics who have sought to cas-
tigate the jury system and suggest that citizens-jurors are unable
to grasp complex factual and scientific issues, the Court stated:
In this regard respondent seems to us to be overly pessimistic
about the capabilities of the jury, and of the adversary system
generally. Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of con-
trary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof
are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky
but admissible evidence. 10
Having disposed of the approach typified by the easy answers
and shallow reasoning of the decision of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit," the Daubert decision requires
courts to undertake a more thorough analysis of underlying evi-
dence and its foundations. 12 The Daubert Court offered specific
10 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993).
11 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated,
113 S. Ct. 2786, 2799 (1993).
12 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796. The Ninth Circuit's approach was not only superficial but
rather cavalier. For example, the citation to the often criticized media celebrity Peter Hu-
ber. See Mark M. Hager, Civil Compensation and its Discontents: A Response to Huber, 42
[Vol. 9:37
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language that is the conceptual framework for analyzing the ad-
missibility of expert scientific testimony. The Court repeated that
the determination of evidentiary admissibility must be based on
an examination of the principles and methods used by an expert in
formulating an opinion, and not be focused on the validity of the
ultimate opinion itself.13
The significance of this distinction between the methods and
principles, and the ultimate conclusion can be seen in the Bendec-
tin cases themselves. In reading Daubert, there is little question
that the principles, methods, and the credentials of plaintiffs' ex-
perts were not seriously challenged. None of the techniques relied
on by plaintiffs' experts, "in vivo," "in vitro," pharmacological anal-
ysis and reanalysis of epidemiological data were said to be novel
techniques. Defendant merely quarreled with the conclusions
drawn from them. To persuade the courts to throw out plaintiff's
Bendectin cases, Merrell Dow will need strategies not pursued in
Daubert.
II. FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR DEFENDANTS BASED ON THE
COURT'S REQUIREMENT THAT AN OPINION BE BASED ON
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
A blueprint for defense strategy comes from the Court's state-
ment that the expert opinion must be based on "scientific knowl-
edge."' 4 Simply stated, in terms of a Bendectin case, the defend-
ant will argue that there is no scientific evidence that Bendectin
causes birth defects. Plaintiffs will rejoin that the question of
whether Bendectin causes birth defects is the ultimate conclusion,
rather than methods and principles, upon which the Court stated
the Court may not exclude expert testimony. Furthermore, the
plaintiffs will argue that their ultimate opinion on causation is
supported by scientific knowledge in the "in vivo," "in vitro," phar-
macological and epidemiologic data relied on by plaintiffs' experts.
Defendants will insist in every case that scientific knowledge is
required to support each logical step developed by the plaintiff to
establish causation. For instance, if epidemiologic studies estab-
STAN. L. REV. 539, 540 (1990); see also Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's
Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637, 1638 (1993).
13 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797. "The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate." Id.
14 Id. at 2796.
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lish an association between exposure A and result B, defendant
will argue that the requisite scientific knowledge does not exist if
any factor in the instant case, such as dose or latency period, var-
ies from what has been demonstrated in scientific studies.
The defendant will frame their attack on plaintiffs' experts in
terms of criticism of their overall reasoning. Based on the Daubert
Court's language that expert testimony must be based on scien-
tific methods and principles, the defendant will argue that the ex-
perts' reasoning process are not scientific. The defendant will ar-
gue that the plaintiffs' experts' opinion cannot be said to be based
on scientific knowledge because the reasoning which ties together
the strands of evidence into a conclusion does not have the degree
of certainty and support required to justify a scientific conclusion.
Plaintiffs will respond that this argument merely raises questions
of weight, credibility, and degree of certainty and should not be
decided as a question of law. Plaintiffs will also point out that the
position of defendants inevitably raises the standard of proof well
beyond what is required. The Daubert decision provides little sup-
port for evidentiary attacks on the experts reasoning as opposed to
the underlying foundational basis.
Defense counsel has been encouraged by the Daubert Court's ci-
tation to Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 5 and Brock
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 16 in support of its statement
that courts have adequate remedies to dispose of cases that do not
have a factual basis, such as through directed verdict, summary
judgment, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 7 Judge Jack
15 959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 84 (1992). The court affirmed the
motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1360. The evidence, particularly animal studies, was
held insufficient to allow a rational jury to find that Bendectin caused minor plaintiffs
birth defects. Id. at 1350. The district court stated:
Taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the scientific evidence that provides
the foundation for the expert opinion on causation in this case is not sufficient to allow
a jury to find that it is more probable than not Bendectin caused the minor plaintiffs
injury. Therefore the case should not go to the jury.
Id.
16 874 F.2d 307, 315 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990) (judgment
notwithstanding the verdict). The district court stated: "In light of the evidence presented,
we are convinced that the Brocks did not present sufficient evidence regarding causation to
allow a trier of fact to make a reasonable inference that Bendectin caused Rachael Brock's
limb reduction defect." Id.
17 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993). The
Court stated: "These conventional devices [summary judgment, directed verdicts, etc.],
rather than wholesale exclusion under an uncompromising 'general acceptance' test, are
the appropriate safeguards where the basis of scientific testimony meets the standards of
Rule 702." Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 702. Rule 702 provides, in relevant part: "If scientific,
[Vol. 9:37
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Weinstein of the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York, has suggested that what he views to be the in-
adequacies of plaintiffs' evidence on causation in Bendectin cases
should not be viewed as a question of evidentiary admissibility,
but rather as a question of sufficiency of evidence.' Judge Wein-
stein has argued that the defeat of the plaintiffs' Bendectin claims
can be accomplished merely by giving a more lengthy dissertation
of the reasons for the Court's holding than was provided in the
opinion by the Ninth Circuit. 19 As an example, Judge Weinstein
cites the decision of the trial court in DeLuca v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.20 Regardless of whether the point of attack
is the alleged lack of "scientific knowledge," criticism of scientific
reasoning, or legal sufficiency of evidence, the implicit thrust of
defendant's assault on plaintiffs evidence of causation is to raise
the standard of proof on elements of plaintiffs case toward scien-
tific certainty and away from the preponderance of the evidence.
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or other-
wise." Id.
18 See United States District Court Judge Jack B. Weinstein, Remarks at the ABA Pro-
gram on Scientific Evidence (Aug. 9, 1993); see also Gerald W. Boston, A Mass-Exposure
Model of Toxic Causation: The Content of Scientific Proof and the Regulatory Experience, 18
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 181 passim (1993). The author contends:
Whether the "tests" are viewed as governed by the admissibility of expert testimony,
such as pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703, or 403, or the adequacy or
sufficiency of the plaintiffs proofs, the courts are understandably less willing to allow a
jury determination of causation in the absence of epidemiological and compelling toxi-
cological proof in mass exposure cases.
Id. The author further states that many commentators and courts erroneously believe that
the same standards of proof should be applied to all cases. Id. Instead, he postulates that
whenever epidemiologic evidence exists, such evidence should be required. Id. By contrast,
where epidemiologic studies are unavailable, the courts should not demand that such stud-
ies be an indispensable element of plaintiffs proof. Id.
19 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding that plaintiffs reanalysis was neither published, nor subject to peer review
and therefore not admissible), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2799 (1993) (holding that general
acceptance not necessary precondition to admissibility of scientific evidence).
20 791 F. Supp. 1035, 1041 (D. N.J. 1990). The court in a 17 page opinion listed 120
findings of fact, including that approximately 65% of all birth defects are of unknown ori-
gin. Id. It also listed 41 conclusions of law, including that summary judgment is proper
where a party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and where
he bears the burden of proof. Id. at 1059.
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III. PLAINTIFFS' STRATEGY BASED ON THE DAUBERT COURT'S
RECOGNITION OF SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTIES AND JURIES'
DETERMINATIONS OF DISPUTED FACTS
Plaintiffs will rely on the Court's repeated statement that the
admissibility of plaintiffs' expert opinion can only be attacked by
showing that the methods and principles used in formulating that
opinion are not scientifically valid, rather than an attack on the
ultimate opinion.21 Plaintiffs will develop their position during
depositions of the defendants' experts in which plaintiffs will seek
admissions that defendants' experts have relied on the same kinds
of methods, principles, and techniques as the plaintiffs' experts.
Plaintiffs will search the defendants' experts' writings to find reli-
ance on similar methods and techniques and will point to govern-
ment policies and other authorities that rely on similar data, prin-
ciples, and methods.2 2
This strategy will be pursued further by filing motions in limine
to challenge the defendants' experts. These motions will point out
the similarity of techniques and principles employed by the ex-
perts on both sides. The in limine motions will underscore the in-
herent uncertainties that underlie the scientific questions before
the Court. Although science in the abstract is often described as
being based on high levels of certainty and empirical verification,
day-to-day decisions of scientists and physicians are based on
much less definitive data to which their judgment is applied.23
21 See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2790. The Court stated:
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony under Rule 702, the trial judge,
pursuant to Rule 104(a), must make a preliminary assessment of whether the testi-
mony's underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid and properly can be
applied to the facts at issue .... The inquiry is a flexible one, and its focus must be
solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.
Id.
22 The amicus brief of the American Society of Medicine and Ethics et al., demonstrated
that federal regulatory agencies as a matter of policy routinely rely on unpublished data.
See, e.g., Final Guidelines for Developmental Toxicity Risk Assessment, 56 Fed. Reg.
63,798 (1991); Environmental Protection Agency, Proposed Guidelines for Assessing Fe-
male Reproductive Risk, 53 Fed. Reg. 24,834 (1988).
23 See Charles M. Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Fact Finding at the Frontier
of Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. REV. 521 (1988). The author states that there is a difference in the
level of certainty between the expert that testifies and the lab scientist. The legal standard
requires the expert to express his opinion with assurance. Mere possibility is not enough,
nor is complete assurance necessary. Between this range, however, the author states that
the lab scientist when given data will delay his judgment on the ultimate question of causa-
tion until more testing can be done. In contrast, a doctor or lawyer does not have this
privilege and is sometimes required to render his judgment once he obtains a reasonable
working conclusion. Id.; see also E.K. Silbergeld, The Role of Toxicology in Causation: A
Scientific Perspective, 1 CTS. HLTH. Sc. & L. 374 (1991).
[Vol. 9:37
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Being clear, explicit, and unashamed about uncertainties in sci-
ence will do much to eliminate the kind of inaccurate mis-
characterizations which have plagued legal decisions on scientific
questions.24 For example, although lawyers and judges have fre-
quently repeated "the evidence proves that Bendectin does not
cause birth defects," responsible scientists, including those testify-
ing for defendants in Bendectin cases, acknowledge that this as-
sertion is incorrect. To state that the evidence is not adequate to
demonstrate that A causes B or even that the existing evidence
suggests that A does not cause B is a very far cry from scientific
proof that A does not cause B.
As the courts delve more deeply into the uncertainties that exist
in science, more of the knee-jerk responses that are tied to sim-
plistic labels will fall away. A recent example was developed in
the Stringfellow acid pits trial.25 A well-known defense expert, Dr.
Philip Guzelian, was prepared to testify that there was no harm
from toxic exposures because they were below threshold limit val-
ues ("TLVs"). This testimony was attacked by plaintiffs on the
ground that the TLVs were not based on scientific data. Relying
on information from a variety of sources, the plaintiffs demon-
strated to the court that these exposure limits, although widely
relied on and so often automatically accepted, were not based on
scientific knowledge.26
Another strategy to be employed will be the presentation of an
epistemologic expert." Because the Supreme Court has stated
that an evidentiary attack on an expert must be based on methods
and principles, the party offering an expert may present a back-
ground expert who can testify as to the legitimacy of the primary
expert's methods and principles. For example, the Court stated
24 See generally Kenneth J. Rothman, Supreme Court Ruling Edges Courtroom Closer to
Science, 21 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 11-26 (Summer-Fall 1993). The
Daubert decision will force courts to look behind labels and understand the underlying un-
certainties. Id. The author points to the fallacy of a peer review standard by noting that if
such articles were the sine qua non of all decisions, the court would simply get the articles
and need no experts. Id.
25 Newman v. J.B. Stringfellow, No. 167122, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 1991).
26 Barry I. Castleman, Sc.D. & Grace E. Ziem, M.D., Ph.D., Corporate Influence on
Threshold Limit Values, 13 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 531 (1988); Myra Karstadt, Teratogenesis,
Carcinogenesis, and Mutagenesis, Quantitative Risk Assessment: Qualms and Questions, 8
Am. J. MED. 137 (1988); S.A. Roach, Sc.D., Ph.D. & S.M. Rappaport, Ph.D., But They Are
Not Thresholds: A Critical Analysis of the Documentation of Threshold Limit Values, 17
AM. J. MED. 727 (1990).
27 DoRLND's ILLUSTRATED MEDIcAL DIcTIoNARY 570 (27th ed. 1988). Epistemology is de-
fined as the science of the methods and validity of knowledge.
1993]
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that scientific evidence must "fit," meaning that the scientific in-
formation (the example given was the phases of the moon) must be
an appropriate fit to the question it purports to answer (how much
moonlight there was on the night in question rather than predic-
tions of strange human behavior).28 The epistemologic expert can
provide support for the expert testimony by indicating that the
methods and principles are an appropriate fit to answer the ques-
tion at issue.
In response to the effort of a defendant to repackage arguments
formerly made on the basis of evidentiary admissibility and trans-
form them into attacks on evidentiary insufficiency, the plaintiff
will have to define more clearly the issues to be addressed and the
logical steps needed to reach the ultimate conclusion. In reading
the second decision of the district court in DeLuca,29 one is struck
by an unstructured aggregation of unrelated factual details and
arguments that favor one position. Nowhere are the counter-ar-
guments or evidence set out. More significantly, the role that each
fact or argument plays in the ultimate puzzle is not set out. A
tighter and more logical exposition of the issues (much in the way
counsel formulates common issues under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 23 in a motion for class certification) may prevent courts
from justifying a conclusion with a one-sided recitation without
revealing the counter arguments or its process of reasoning.
CONCLUSION
The defense counsel's task in litigation is to demonstrate that
the plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of proof. For the defend-
ant, the notion of "science" is a useful device because it implies,
especially to the scientifically naive, that a very high level of cer-
tainty must be achieved for the plaintiff to prevail.
Although defendants have been successful in promoting reduc-
tionist notions of science to a few courts looking for easy, once-
and-for-all-time escapes from the realities of scientific uncertainty
and complexity, the Supreme Court has recognized that it is not
for judges to decide factual disputes under the guise of simplistic
notions of science or legal conclusions.
Recognizing the ambiguities and uncertainties of science, the
28 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796 (1993).




• . .arguably, there are no certainties in science. See, e.g.,
Brief for Nicholas Blombergen et al., as Amici Curiae 9 ("In-
deed, Scientists do not assert that they know what is immuta-
bly 'true'-they are committed to searching for new, tempo-
rary theories to explain, as best they can, phenomena"); Brief
for American Association for the Advancement of Science and
the National Academy of Sciences as Amici Curiae 7-8 ("Sci-
ence is not an encyclopedic body of knowledge about the uni-
verse. Instead, it represents a process for proposing and re-
fining theoretical explanations about the world that are
subject to further testing and refinement").3 0
The Supreme Court, in Daubert, unequivocally rejected defend-
ant's strategy of arguing that "plaintiffs experts opinion must be
based on scientific knowledge," in order to indirectly require the
plaintiff to prove elements of its case to a scientific certainty. The
Court distinguished between scientific validity and reliability31 in
recognition that scientists and courts use the same terms in vastly
different ways, and in order to avoid possible confusion. The
Court took pains to distinguish two key scientific terms and pro-
vide its own definition of the pivotal legal term. The Court
"note[d] that scientists typically distinguish between 'validity'
(does the principle support what it purports to show?) and 'relia-
bility' (does application of the principle produce consistent re-
sults?)."32 The distinction is evidently critical to scientists and, as
it turned out, is also essential to the Court's guidance on Federal
Rule of Evidence 702.
Obviously, the determination of whether a specific scientific
proposition is to be deemed admissible in a particular case will
turn largely on which of these two scientific criteria-fundamen-
tal theoretical support for the proposition in question or the ability
to obtain consistent results upon application of the proposition-
was chosen by a court as the legal threshold. Clearly, the
Supreme Court could have decided that both standards were nec-
essary and that neither was sufficient; that is, it could have de-
cided that in order for a particular proposition to be deemed trust-
worthy and reliable and therefore admissible, the proponent
30 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
31 Id. at 2795 n.9.
32 Id.
19931
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would have to show that the proposition enjoyed both a sound the-
oretical basis in the principles of science and a firm factual foun-
dation in consistent experimental results. However, having made
the distinction, the Court required only the first, sound theoretical
basis. Scientific validity, but not demonstrated empirical results
(reliability), is required.
In terms of Bendectin, the meaning is clear; the plaintiff need
not present scientific experiments that provide scientific proof
that Bendectin causes birth defects; plaintiffs must only provide
scientific opinion based on the methods and techniques generally
used that causation is more likely than not.
It is hardly surprising that jurists insist that there must be a
very high standard of proof. Nor is it surprising that jurists not
trained in science are persuaded to grasp at reductionist formulas
to address complex, multilevel uncertainties. But the Supreme
Court has unequivocally rejected this approach and left the dis-
puted facts in the hands of the jury.
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